Problems of Interaction between State and Economy under the Post-Communist Transition: The Perspective of Islamic Political Economy

Fuad B. Aliyev 2006

Problems of Interaction between State and Economy under the Post-Communist Transition: The Perspective of Islamic Political Economy

Abstract

The post-communist transition is a unique process, since it involves both economic and political transformation as well as total change of ethical paradigm in the society. Contemporary debate is going on deregulation and role of state from the viewpoints of neo-liberalism, neo-Keynesianism and institutionalism. In this paper the perspective of Islamic political-economic doctrine is discussed and hypothetical implications of this doctrine for post-Soviet nations are presented. It claims that Islamic political economy itself is not synonymous and based on different schools of law as well as local practices, which makes it flexible in time and applicable in different given conditions

Introduction

After the collapse of the USSR in 1991 ex-Soviet republics started to implement the market-oriented reform policies. A transition to the new economic-political order has not been smooth and calm, but accompanied by the economic decline, political cataclysms and military conflicts. All transitional countries based their reform packages to a variable degree on the implications of mainstream political economy, advocated and proposed by the international financial institutions.
The literature on political economy of transition has grown considerably in the last years, probably because of actuality of this problem and uncertainty about the future of market reforms. There have been developed general concepts of interconnection between politics and economic reforms as well as regional or country explanations of the transition of post-Communist countries. However, there has been a little contribution from the perspective of Islamic politico-economic doctrine. The only real contribution to the theory and public policy debate was made by Choudhury (1994) in the very beginning of transition and it has partially lost its actuality with time.
Moreover, one may argue that the experience of the post-Soviet countries does not correspond to the expectations of the mainstream political economy for several reasons. In this paper I attempt to summarize and systematize major problems of the post-Communist transition from the viewpoint of state – economy interconnections and then try to frame the approach of Islamic political economy. It is worth mentioning that the former is done through ex ante analysis and has hypothetical character, since there have not been any attempts to frame and implement any “Islam based” policies.

Political Economy of Post-Communist Transition
First, we must answer the question what do “market reform” and “transition” mean? According to Przeworski market-oriented reforms are the reforms, which aim “to organize an economy that rationally allocates resources and in which the state is financially solvent” (Przeworski 1991, p. 136). Shafiqul Islam highlights four “interlocking wheels” of market-oriented reforms: macroeconomic stabilization. liberalization, privatization and institutional reforms (Islam 1993).
Unprecedented case of "simultaneous economic and political transformation" that has characterized the transitional reforms is highlighted by Joan Nelson (1992, p.1). All newborn countries has had to pass through this dual transformation, but has chosen various policies and had different results. Moreover, economic reforms went successfully in those countries where wealth was distributed more or less equally and there was political consolidation in a society (Rodrik1996).
Above-mentioned issues have to do with the role of ex ante and ex post political constraints in the transition experience. If former deal with feasibility and acceptability of reforms, latter refer to the danger of backlash and reversal after decisions taken and outcomes observed (Roland 1996). In his turn, Hellman argues that although post-communist countries have not suffered from the standard ex ante and ex post constraints to reform, “they have faced an equally difficult set of challenges from an unexpected source” (Hellmann 1998, p. 232); and the political obstacles were one of the most challenging.
Another important issue of academic discussion is the question about what regime type is best suited for the implementation of radical economic reforms. According to Nelson, at first, authoritarian governments were assumed to be advantage for the reforms. However, later studies largely discredited this simple assumption and focused on such issues as electoral cycles, institutional arrangements that give the key economic officials substantial authority while insulating them from direct political pressures (Nelson 1992, Rodrik 1996). In the light of elections in majority of CIS countries, which reportedly were always partly free and not fair, and various measures more or less applied by their governments in order to suppress the opposition this aspect of the reforms gains special importance. In making the choice between authoritarianism and democratic consolidation, the understanding of the fact that if authoritarian regimes succeed in economic reforms, they eventually become victims of their own success, generating social forces that no longer need the protection or are willing to suffer the constraints of authoritarian rule, may be helpful (Diamond - Plattner 1995).
There are also debates on the role of state in the market reforms with the emphasis on the ability of this major social institution to ease the pain of economic transition. O'Donnell (1993) in his analysis of the state's role in socio-political transformations proposed three important dimensions in which a profound crisis of some reformer Latin American states existed:
· the state as a set of bureaucracies capable of discharging their duties with reasonable efficacy;
· the effectiveness of its law;
· plausibility of the claim that the state agencies normally orient their decisions in terms of some conception of the public good.
There is also a clear gap in transition between major Central and Eastern European nations and CIS countries. The experience of the post-Soviet countries does not correspond to the expectations of the mainstream political economy for several reasons. First, it contradicts the “exchange theory” and the approach to interests as required by the notion of “homo economicus”. In the post-Soviet space political-economic processes are framed by the factors of cultural, ethnic and religious nature, thus dealing more with values. Another factor is that “rational egoism” of post-Soviet individuals, seeking individual interests, is in conflict with the “collective notions” such as group interests, national interests, national goals and priorities, civilization, socio-cultural and confessional identities (Panarin 2001, Kara-Murza 2002). A huge trade-off between economic efficiency and social justice in these countries can also be seen (Choudhury 1994).
Another issue of high importance is the crisis of ethics in the above-mentioned countries. The problem of the approach by present reformers, inspired by the ideas and credits coming from the West, is of the methodological nature. The matter is that the neo-classical assumptions of bounded economic rationality still remain intrinsic in it while ethics treated as exogenous variable (although considered important by many authors, e.g. Weber, Durkheim, Sen, Rawls, Nozick and others). While we would argue paraphrasing Choudhury that ethics is endogenous in the systems of socio-politico-economic relations and that application of a reform package depends on a priori reframing the ethico-economic relations between polity and market as a result of new knowledge flows.

The Crisis of Ethics
Present crisis of ethics has its roots in the Soviet past. Then the communistic ethics, based on the Marxist theory, dominated. Pre-reform ethics are important because this is ex ante situation to be transformed ex post. A «Communist ethic» is based on Marx’s theory, and has the same epistemological premises as other theories. It is based on equal distribution of wealth according to people’s labor contribution in social production.
One of the explanations of the collapse can be observed in ethical dimension too. In fact, starting from late 60s the local elites and nomenclature started to appear and develop. Then, a new bourgeois caste emerged and their behavior and lifestyles were far from ideals of classics and constructors of the System. Nomenclature made use of state guarantees and soft budget constraints and was absolutely unaccountable. This situation reached its peak during the Perestroika and set the conditions for the establishment of a new business class (Aliyev 2003).
Although Communism was an atheistic ideology, it contained strong moral principles and ideas taken from religion: equality, honesty, hard-working, social justice, etc. Party members were under the strong control and censorship and their ethical behavior was being tested all the time. However these ethical constraints started to loosen when development of the new elite within Party was given a momentum.
Collapse of the party censorship set free nomenclature from any civil and moral responsibility. Tops got rid of the “ethic of duty”, bottoms got tempted by the declared permissiveness. Thus we can say that “protestant ethics” of capitalism could not substitute a communist one. The fact is that rational “Homo soveticus” searching for optimal way of gaining profits prefers rent seeking to the legal business activity, as the former is easier and faster.
Data shows the worst results for main political and economic indicators of the post-Soviet Muslim nations (The World Bank 2002). In fact, most of all so-called Muslim nations in transition are among the lagging ones, and implications of the mainstream political economy did not work in these countries. As a result we have mainly centralized political regimes with the underdeveloped institutions of market economy.
The lack of political and business culture and not appropriate behavior of the main actors are of high importance. This is a Western system based on Western values in some ways alien to local population and moreover not accompanied by appropriate Western institutions.
At the same time these nations are not Muslim enough when it comes to business activity and political decision-making (Aliyev 2004). According to the recent study 11% - 14% of the surveyed businessmen in Azerbaijan may be called ”active” believers, which means that they obey the various Islamic regulations of behavior; while 72% considered themselves as “average religious” (Aliyev 2005). Moreover, the research showed that religious education is very low and perceptions are mixed and confusing. However, for the sake of truth we must mention that in comparison with previous studies the level of religiousity has increased and certain dynamics are observed.
Thus, we may argue that the role of Islam in post-Soviet Muslim nations is going to increase, which creates an opportunity to discuss Islamic political-economic doctrine as possible approach during ongoing economic reforms.

Islamic Political Economy and Its Implications
As aptly noticed by Meybullayev, “Islam is not only a religion, but also a scientific system to justify a socio-political, moral, spiritual and cultural behavioral code.” (Meybullayev 2001: p. 54) Unlike other religions it has its own perspective in almost all spheres of an individual’s and societies’ lives. The peculiarities of an “Islamic approach” are it is legalistic (normative) nature and ethic’s endogeneity. The former is related to the crucial role of Islamic law in all spheres, including economy. The latter is about the role of ethics in all kind of relations between actors. We may also conclude that the latter in a way embraces the former. Let us explain this more in detail.
The principle of ethics endogeneity based on Muslim philosophy is proposed by in Islamic Political Economy could be derived from the following verse of Qur’an: “Verily, Allah does not change a people’s condition until they change what is in their inner selves” (13:11). Crane interprets this verse as follows: “political and social panaceas are ideological delusions, because true transformation of the world is possible only on an individual basis” (Crane 2001: p. 2). Thus the classical Islamic idea of a “perfect man” (contrary to the Christian notion of an “original sin” and its effects on the modern occidental social science) is a key to understanding IPE’s approach to socio-economic processes and relations.
As new epistomilogical basis ethics endogeneity was first in the modern social science formulated and proposed by Masudul Alam Choudhury - the contemporary pioneer in the field of Islamic Political Economy. Choudhury argues that Islamic socio-economic analysis must be premised on an altogether new epistemology (1992, 1995, 1999, etc). The theoretical foundation of IPE emanates from the complete replacement of neo-classical idea of substitution and its later variations by the Principle of Universal Complementarity (Choudhury 1994). In IPE there is no conflict and trade-off between economic growth and social justice.
Choudhury defines the polity of the Islamic socio-economic order as Shura, which consists of decision-makers who are experts on specific political, socio-economic and scientific issues as well as Shariah. Decisions are made on the collective basis by voting (complete or partial social consensus).
Three main principles of IPE: 1) Tawhid; 2) the principle of social justice; 3) the principle of entitlement (or property rights). In fact, these economic principles already were implemented in the framework of so-called “Tawhid Economy” in post-revolutinary Iran by Abolhossein Banisadr, economic advisor of ayatollah Khomeini and the first President of IRI.
The principal instruments for IPE: 1) abolition of usury (Riba), 2) institutions of Mudarabah (profit-sharing with cooperation) and Musharakah (equity participation); 3) the institution of wealth tax (Zakat); and 4) elimination of waste (Israf). On top of these other secondary instruments can be built.
This approach differs from that of classical, neoclassical, Marxist, institutionalist and others. The reason for this difference in terminology is that the focus here is essentially on a study of the endogenous role of ethico-economic relationships between polity and deep ecological system with the market as its grand subsystem. An Islamic market is neither severed from the social and socio-political system, nor is under pressure of institutional policing. The independence of market process is respected but its moral standing is necessitated by IPE (Choudhury, various years).
Thus, positive aim of IPE is developing integration through interactions between the Shura and the market system in accordance with the percept of Qur’an and Sunnah – fundamental sources of knowledge. According to Choudhury the power of these sources of knowledge in IPE is based on the belief that human reason must comprehend naturally the inevitability and perpetuation of truth in God’s Oneness in the order of things (Tawhid). According to Yezdi (1996) Tawhid is the root of all Islamic ideology and the system of values. God’s Oneness is the cause and effect of the interactively integrated process of the universe and is expressed both in the realm of comprehension and in the order of cognitive reality. As a result, in the epistemology of Tawhid the difference between Kantian a priori and a posteriori does not exist, and the ontological difference between form and reality is also inessential (Choudhury 1993).
Tawhid is supposed to guide Shura in deriving its knowledge from the premise of Shariah and developing necessary policy prescription on specific issues (Ahkam). Thus, the concept of Shura as consultation leading to integration (social consensus) is a universal premise of systems and processes (Choudhury 1995).
Following Choudhury, we can define IPE’s methodology, which consists of Qur’an, Sunnah (traditions of the Prophet (saw) (plus Imams (as) for Shiite doctrine), Ijma (consensus through discursions on specific issues) and Ijtehad (interpretation of Qur’an and Sunnah as a result of Ijma on a certain issue). Ijma and Ijtehad are not static but dynamic and consensus is sought as discursions continue. Therefore, Qur’anic verses and interpretations of the Prophet’s traditions are not dogmatic (if it comes to details) but the main source of knowledge from which new knowledge can be derived. In Qur’an it is said: “He is in work everyday” (55:29) or “The hands of Allah are open” (5:64).
However, since the economic system of Islam is founded on the basis of Shariah, divergences in opinions are rooted not only in sources of Shariah, but also interpretations. As Nomani and Rahnema argue, based on these divergences an Islamic political-economic thought can be divided according to three approaches to state and economy interactions (Nomani and Rahnema 1994: p. 55). First, an economic system built on rule of law in its strict understanding and providing perfectly competitive market system can be labeled as “Islamic market mechanism”. Second, a system built on the “equitable spirit” of the law and having egalitarian nature will be “Islamic plan mechanism”. Plan here is a coordinating mechanism of political economy. Finally, the combination of previous two approaches is called “Islamic plan-then-market mechanism”. The latter approach of Islamic political economy is the one that is most applicable in case of the post-Communist transition in the countries with the majority of Muslim population.
This approach assumes that depending on changing nature of politico-economic process market regulation should be adjusted. In case of the losers from the market reforms, who can not translate their need into effective demand, there is need for more state intervention to ensure the principle of social justice. Thus the minimum needs of the whole population must be met and no matter how the wealthiest stratum is better off, the poorest stratum should be focused upon. This approach in a way can be compared with Rawls’ concept of justice as a fairness (Rawls 1971). The problem here is in defining above mentioned minimal needs, which is the point of discourse between different scholars (Nomani and Rahnema: p. 60).
In general, variety of interpretations between and within major madhabs (4 sunni and 2 shia) is a sort of double blessing. From the viewpoint of religious unity it causes certain problems, but in terms of applicability of Islamic norms in different countries it creates great flexibility. The case of Malaysian Islam-based development strategies would be the brilliant example. The core issue is presence of Islamic ethics and institutions that support it.

Conclusion and Recommendations
Taking into consideration the main politico-economic problems, which can be divided into problems of institutions, problems of ethics and pure economic problems, we may argue that the approach of Islamic political economy can address both of these problems.
For the successful continuation of market reforms the following policy recommendations could be given:
1) acceleration of institutional reforms to create market-supporting institutions and especially reforming public administration system;
2) gaining social consensus and strengthening social capital development;
3) building appropriate ‘political culture’ and legal self-consciousness;
4) further liberalization and privatization.
Development of the market-supporting institutions encompasses constitutional, legislative, legal, monetary, fiscal and public administration institutions. The reform of administrative structures and functions is among the principal declared priorities of the Government. Such reform assumes the transition from highly centralized and politicized decision-making system to more modern democratic and flexible forms of management (World Bank 2003). Despite some relative progress in decentralization of policy formulation and coordination system, policy-making there are still traces of the previous administrative-command system and remains relatively top-heavy. Another important issue for structural reform is the development of adequate coordination mechanisms and setting up clear accountability and transparency. This reforms strategy stresses the need to turn public bodies and institutions into flexible organization, which function in line with the requirements of the modern market economy and follow the example of profit-making organization. It is aimed to separate politics and administration and make public bodies work according to the principles of modern public management. This requires strengthening cooperative interactions between polity and market, state and economy through Shura.
As already was stressed by many authors as well as above in this paper the successful continuation of reforms requires consensus between main strata of society through institualization of social dialogue between the government, business, NGOs (e.g. trade unions). This might require the public structure with a specific representation of social diversity within the state based on the principles of distributed authority and distributed intelligence (Bruszt 2000). Moreover, economic reforms tend to be more successful in those countries where wealth was distributed more or less equally and there was political consolidation in a society (Rodrik 1996). From the perspective of Islamic political economy this will assume introducing of above-discussed Shuratic process. Pure economic instruments of Islamic political economy such as zakat, abolition of riba, profit sharing institutions and abolition of israf will imply more state intervention. However, keeping in mind our plan-then-market model we would assume that all steps are to be taken sequentially. Moreover, taking into consideration current political and economic realities as well as secular nature of the post-Soviet space some institutions will not be able to be introduced fully (e.g. abolition of riba) and might have disastrous effect in case of the full introduction.
Another important issue is relevant for a market economy ‘political culture’, when politicians’ motives are rather to serve the public interests than their personal. Such policies are impossible where rent-seeking behavior and personal self-enrichment are the norms of political life. In the latter case we have developed political opportunism in a form of ‘selective income and wealth redistribution, influenced by special interests that benefit from policies that are disadvantageous for the population at large. (Hillman 1999) Once the relevant political culture is developed and political power is democratized the public and the political actors will be able to realize a necessity of consensus as well as the gap between ‘law on the books’ and their enforcement would be decreased. Islamic ethics are to play the major role in forming appropriate political culture supporting Shuratic process.
If morals of economic agents influence final results, then “economists concerned with public policy and social welfare may want to say something abouth whether public policies ought to encourage certain kinds of behavior” (Hausman and McPherson 1993: p. 685). This statetment is supported by Reder’s analysis of the economics of honesty, finding that more honesty reduces contracting and policing costs, and policies that promote it will raise net economic output (Reder 1979). Reder suggests that social investment in schools and churches may have this economic justification. This in turn will require the institutions which promote certain moral behavior. These institutions are impossible without active role and cooperation of state and civil society.
Further liberalization involves, first of all, managing the exchange rate, making it convertible for the current account, integration with the world economy, reforming labor and financial markets. Privatization of the economy here is understood in two ways: 1) transfer of the state-owned property to the private owners in coming future; 2) increase of share of private sector in GDP and 3) strong support for profit-sharing ventures (e.g. credit unions, special partnerships). This requires development of a new private sector, reform of ownership and corporate governance (liquidation, restructuring, commercialization, and privatization of existing enterprises), stock market and Islamic financial instruments as well as property rights reforms of land and housing.
Thus, ethical crisis and institutional gap are obvious shortcomings than significantly deuce the efficiency of interconnections between state and economy. This turns out to be a real problem and obstacle for democratization of polity and development of political economies in transition. For changing the status-quo we propose simultaneous impact of Islam-based “three Is”: ideologies, institutions and interests.
Ideology sets the ethico-cultural basis for a new system, institutions cerate the system itself, and interests keep this system developing since actors are interested in it and not in any other system. The combination of “three Is” lead to emergence, strengthening and development of a new ethical paradigm, which, in turn, influences on them.
Islamic ideology could be of help for moral transformation of the post-Soviet Muslim societies (Aliyev 2003). However, as already was argued, Islam as a system of values has not become a national ideology and could not fill ideological vacuum, which appeared after the collapse of the Communist ideology. As a result transitional Muslim societies could not make use of embedded in Islam moral advantages and avoid ethical problems. The role of clergy in this failure is very significant and should the topic of a special research.
The ideology and institutions are interconnected. Institutions may be good or bad. Among the good institutions are market institutions (markets, competition, free entrepreneurship etc.), institution of the government and efficient control, rule of law, strong local self-government, public control and so forth. Institutionally strong state may resist corruption, and as a result influence formation of the appropriate ethics. Colliding in daily life with right institutions and living under advocacy of the ideology based on universal values and morals, each citizen will be learning how to behave herself and know good things from bad ones. Proper ethics without improper institutions are impossible, which is brilliantly stated in the letter of the fourth pious khalifa Ali ibn Abu Taleb (as) to Malik al-Ashtar (Governor of Eypt)[1].
On the other hand, it is necessary to remember that interests are one of the main incentive motives in lives of people and their communities. In a society the consensus - a certain public contract between all interested groups (political, ethnic, regional, religious and professional) is necessary. Such a consensus can be officilized through the Constitution or any substituting document (Bruszt 2001). A state, in turn, should watch that all parts of the contract observe its regulations, enforcing if needed as well as to protect their rights. Thus, successful symbiosis of a stick with a carrot, when “marginal utility” of honesty is higher than “marginal utility” of corruption and improper behavior, is necessary.
Any economic policy besides direct influence has also indirect effect of informational-educational character. Political actions bring certain knowledge flows, which signal about the changes in directions of the policy and expectations from the target groups of this policy. Implementing consecutive actions in the framework of a certain policy we deal with the field of ideology, institutes and interests. Thus, we train a society and form the appropriate ethical paradigm. Potential role of Islam for post-Communist Muslim nations in this process should not be underestimated.



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[1] Dor more detail see http://al-islam.org/nahj/